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ABSTRACT
This article is an attempt to answer a number of questions asked in the literature
on radicalization and extremism: What motivates foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs)
from Turkey to join the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)? In what kind of
environment does violent extremism become the choice for Turkish nationals
to join ISIS in Syria and Iraq? How can Turkish nationals who join ISIS be
profiled in terms of their socio-economic and cultural traits and how do these
traits compare people from other nations who join and fight in terrorist
organizations? Though their numbers remained minimal compared to the
overall population, how can we explain the case of Turkish FTFs, when a
peaceful and tolerant ‘Anatolian/Sufi Islam’ has reigned in the country and
Muslims are well integrated in the social, economic, and political life of the
country under the 13-year long rule of Islamic-oriented Justice and
Development Party (AK Party)? What do these answers to these questions
mean for Turkish Islam and possible de-radicalization programs? These
questions will be addressed by semi-structured interviews conducted both
with Turkish FTFs who have joined ISIS and with family members of some of
those who have returned from fighting with ISIS.
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Introduction
Though not a new phenomenon,1 the involvement of tens of thousands of
foreign fighters in the Syrian war has brought the issue of foreign terrorist
fighters (FTFs) to the forefront of global politics. Many publications have
hitherto been produced on what motivates foreign fighters to join jihadi
activity, their radicalization processes, networks of recruitment and transpor-
tation, the role of social media, and the rehabilitation and de-radicalization of
these fighters.2 However, after at least two decades of global discourse on the
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subject of terrorism, the field is still in critical need of solid research on the
ground in the face of new and more daunting challenges.3
While this article addresses issues covered in the existing literature, our
main arguments rely on interviews with Turkish returnees from the jihadist
battleground in Syria and relatives of those who lost their lives fighting for
jihad in Syria. Due to its long and porous border with Syria and its vital stra-
tegic importance to confront the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Turkey
has been thrust into the limelight of this multi-sided and multi-party conflict.
The conflict has posed pressing challenges to Turkey, as it has tried to insure
that confronting ISIS did not cause the misconception that ‘ISIS is a causa sui
phenomenon that has suddenly materialized out of the thin ether of an evil
doctrine.’4 This has continued while Turkey has been cooperating with the
international community to control its border and stop new jihadi recruits
from crossing into Syria to join ISIS while ISIS terror attacks have increasingly
hit Turkey.
At the same time, Turkey also has had to address the issue of its own citizens
joining ISIS. To our knowledge, there is no field research and empirical data
that exists on these Turkish foreign fighters. The Turkish case poses new and
equally interesting puzzles to be solved, mainly on the ground that while it is
possible to find answers in the literature to the question of why and how the
young among minority Muslims living in Europe radicalize and join extremist
organizations such as ISIS,5 the same cannot be said for Turkey. Low levels of
political participation, disillusionment felt with governments, and a dismal
record of social, economic, and political integration in Muslim-majority
countries in the Middle East and North Africa may partly explain why
people may radicalize in Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia.6 Or, for some other fight-
ers, jihadmayhave simply become away of life. Dedicated to living a life of jihad
or having nowhere to turn to after exiting a conflict zone (e.g. Afghanistan),
many jihadists may just run from one theater of ‘jihad’ to another.7
If this is the case, how can we explain the puzzling case of Turkey, a
Muslim-majority country, where tolerant, anti-violent ‘Anatolian Islam’ or
‘Sufi Islam’ with more emphasis on ‘greater jihad’ in terms of personal spiri-
tual growth has been promoted for many decades and where Muslims are far
better integrated into the social, economic, and political life of the country
under the 14-year-long rule of Islamic-oriented Justice and Development
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), but from which officially about
2000 foreign fighters have participated in jihad in the ranks of ISIS or al-
Nusra Front?8 These contrasts make Turkey a deviant case that does not sit
very easily with existing assumptions, categorizations, and arguments avail-
able in the literature.9 A carefully conducted exploratory field-work study
of Turkish FTFs may provide answers, and may provoke new thoughts on
the hotly debated issues of terrorism, radicalization, and de-radicalization.
In addition to addressing the intriguing puzzle laid out above, we also
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discuss what this unlikely juxtaposition –moderation and high levels political
participation with a starkly contrasted high number of foreign fighters –
means for the current and future state of Turkish Islamism.
The profile of FTFs
While some experts and analysts have long held on to the idea that ‘macro-
social level factors’ such as the inability of governments in the Muslim
world to provide economic growth and political freedoms to their peoples
are the primary causes of extremism and terrorism,10 scholars rarely hang
on to this idea anymore. If economic and political deprivation was a cause
for extremism, the number of Turkish foreign fighters, which has had an
impressive record of economic growth and expansion of political rights and
freedoms for conservative Muslims, would have been far less. Terrorists
and foreign fighters may or may not necessarily come from a poor socio-econ-
omic background.11 It has been noted that these people are often well edu-
cated, may belong to middle-class families, and may not necessarily even
have criminal backgrounds.12 Stenersen noted that in the case of foreign fight-
ers in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Pakistan-Afgha-
nistan border between 2002 and 2006, the profile of foreign fighters range
from highway robbers to lawyers and engineers.13 With regard to the latter,
several scholars have noted that ‘engineers’ constituted a common breed
among terrorists, including among those involved in the 9/11 attacks.14
Saad Eddin Ibrahim noted in 1980 that the leaders and many members of
Egyptian terrorist organizations such as the Repentance and Holy Flight
group and Technical Military Academy group were educated in universities.
They also approached universities as a recruiting ground.15 The members of
these two militant groups were not marginalized or alienated; they also came
from cohesive families with no records of divorce.16
The motivators for terrorism and becoming a foreign fighter may also run
the gamut of causes from religion,17 adventure,18 greed (money-making),19
and brainwashing.20 Feelings of existential threat one feels for an ethnic, reli-
gious and other group to which he feels attached may also play a role.21 These
factors more or less correspond to Borum and Feinn’s categorization of
foreign fighters’ psychological profiles in terms of ‘revenge seeker’ (anger
towards a person or group) ‘status seeker’ (after recognition and esteem),
‘identity seeker’ (after belonging and meaning), and ‘thrill seeker’ (adventur-
ist).22 A particularly common theme in the existing literature is the role sup-
posedly played by veteran jihadis in radicalizing and recruiting foreign
fighters as well as facilitating and coordinating their arrival in the conflict
zone.23 There is also emphasis on the role played by social ties provided by
family connections, friendship, and kinship in the recruitment phase.24
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That is, brothers and close friends may radicalize together and get recruited
more easily into terrorist groups.25
The other significant matter in the literature concerns the question of what
to do with returning foreign fighters, primarily in the context of the threat
posed by ‘returning Western foreign fighters.’ There is an ongoing debate
on if criminalization or rehabilitation/de-radicalization programs are the
right policies to deal with the returning foreign fighters and tackle their
attendant dilemmas.26 Malet thinks that reintegration programs could help
states decrease the overall number of foreign fighters and curb their persist-
ence. Otherwise, foreign fighters will have nowhere to go and nothing to do
but look for other war-zones.27 For instance, if some foreign fighters went
from one theater of conflict to another in the past, this may be because
they had no other option. For example, the Egyptian and Syrian governments
did not allow them to return home.28 According to Malet,
foreign fighters who remain unrepatriated, or merely even unassimilated into
routine jobs by their home communities, are likely for reasons of economic
and/or psychological displacement to remain floating regional mercenary war-
riors, part of a seasoned, pre-trained ‘insurgent diaspora’ that is particularly
attractive to rebel groups.29
A considerable number of observers agree that de-radicalization programs
are needed to deal with this ominous threat and that criminalizing them and
therefore preventing their return will not be helpful.30 There is no definitive
answer based on solid research or longitudinal statistics on how many retur-
nees are successfully integrated into their home societies and how many
became recidivists and why some de-radicalized while others went back to
their old ways.31
The case of Turkish FTFs
The case of Turkish FTFs involves a major paradox. The idea that there is a
‘Turkish Islam’ separate from Islamic practices and understandings elsewhere
in the Muslim world and that it has fed off ‘the tolerance of Rumi, love of
Yunus and reasonability of Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli’32 is a consistent theme in
some academic literature and popular writing.33 Unlike several other, more
radical streams of Islamic thought elsewhere that has a top-down and com-
munal approach,34 Turkish Islam has largely adopted a bottom-up approach
and focused on the individual as a springboard to change the society gradu-
ally. If al-Qaeda corresponds to ‘violence-later’ method and ISIS has adopted
‘violence-now,’35 Turkish Islamists have largely espoused a ‘violence-never’
method. Several Islamist parties in Turkey contested elections and chose to
work from inside the political system. In the oft-cited distinction between
‘greater jihad,’ which involves personal spiritual growth, and ‘smaller jihad,’
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which involves military struggle to defend Islam,36 Turkish Islamists predo-
minantly praise the former and embrace it as the more difficult and appropri-
ate path to follow in modern conditions.37 In terms of public opinion, three
large surveys done in 1999, 2006, and finally 2014 revealed that Turkish
people do not desire a Sharia state38 and while 99.2 percent of Turkey’s citi-
zens reported being Muslim,39 they did not embrace a dogmatic, literal
reading of Islam and lived it very ‘liberally.’40
One would expect that the development of Turkish Islam among the
people in the Anatolian heartland, thanks mostly to historical, sociological,
and religious sources,41 along with the supposedly moderating impact of
rising prosperity in the last decade and a half, would discourage extremism.
In other words, the claim that there is a ‘cultural base that would push
people to join ISIS’ in Turkey appears unfounded.42 It needs to be kept in
mind as well that the Directorate of Religious Affairs and Turkey’s supposedly
‘Islamist’ AKP government severely criticized ISIS and fight against its ideol-
ogy.43 Konya, the specific city from which we drew our sample of Turkish
FTFs, complicated the paradox further. This city has been one of the AKP’s
strongholds as it repeatedly garnered the highest percentages of votes in
this city. Konya hosts vibrant civil society organizations.44 Konya had the
second lowest unemployment rate in Turkey in 2013 and ranked among
the highest in export numbers as well. It ranked well above the national
averages in happiness ratings and its residents were hopeful about the
future.45 The likelihood of foreign fighters being supporters of the Islamic-
oriented Felicity (Saadet) Party, which may be considered more inflexible
than the AKP on several issues (and is not represented in the Turkish
Grand National Assembly), seems low as well.46 A recent poll revealed that
rejection of ISIS is highest among Saadet sympathizers.47
Under all these disabling circumstances, how is it possible that hundreds, if
not thousands, of Turkish nationals now fight in ISIS ranks?48 This is a for-
midable puzzle that deserves to be untangled. What caused these people to
radicalize despite all the ideational, economic, and political barriers discussed
above? What are their motivations? Admittedly, ‘Anatolian Islam’ had not
stopped many Turks from answering calls for jihad in Afghanistan, Chechnya,
Bosnia, and Kosovo in the 1980s and 1990s.49 However, a close observer called
Turkish participation in these theaters as ‘fringe phenomenon.’50 Several esti-
mates given by different observers and agencies also show that Turks do not
appear in the list of countries that sent foreign fighters to Iraq after the Amer-
ican invasion.51 What does this paradox tell us about the future of political
Islam in Turkey? Do Turkish jihadists also ridicule ‘an Islam that preaches
peace and harmony’ and claim that this type of Islam is ‘invented and pro-
moted by the state,’ as do British members of ISIS?52 Can an accurate
profile of foreign fighters from Turkey be made? Most of these are similar
to the burning questions asked in the literature on radicalization. This
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study seeks to provide some answers to these critical questions at a very
crucial time in regional and global politics based on interviews with ISIS
defectors and their relatives in Konya.
Methodology
The very nature of our research comes with some difficulties of implemen-
tation.53 Finding a former ISIS fighter and even more difficult, being able to
talk to one seemed to be almost impossible for highly understandable reasons.
Aside from ethical reasons, because our research has criminal aspects attached
to it, establishing a very confidential platform between our interviewees and us
was very problematic. Therefore, finding ISIS returnees and/or family members
of thosewho joined ISIS took lots of exchanges of trust building. Extracting their
experiences with ISIS and time in Syria and/or Iraq was even more troubling.
Through several non-profit organizations’ help we managed to identify
several Turkish FTFs and break the ice and enter the closed-circled world of
ISIS. During our interviews we strongly stated that we did not want names or
any kinds of information that would lead to the disclosure of their identity,
which could ultimately jeopardize their post-ISIS life.
During our semi-structured interviews, we asked our respondents ques-
tions such as, ‘What did ISIS mean to you?’, ‘Why did you join ISIS?’,
‘What kind of assignments were you given in ISIS?’ and ‘Why did you
return?’ At times, especially when their parents were present during the inter-
views, we mainly listened to what they had to say about their associations with
ISIS and their story of disengagement. We deliberately avoided intervening
too often and asking questions which might have pushed them in an embar-
rassing position during their family members.
Once we entered their world, we were able, using a snowball technique, to
reach many more returnees and the families of either deceased fighters or
those who are still continuing to fight with ISIS. In the end, we were able
to converse with 22 returnees and their first-degree family members (father,
mother, sisters, or brothers), altogether making up about 35 individuals.
Though our sample may appear small, it marks a significant number of
ISIS recruits interviewed when compared to several existing studies on radi-
calization and extremism especially with reference to ISIS and Syrian battle-
ground. This number was a satisfying one for us especially considering there
were only a few hundred people who joined ISIS from Konya, a city of more
than a million residents. This article exclusively focuses on Turkish partici-
pation in ISIS from the city of Konya for the specific reasons laid out
earlier and is therefore not concerned with what the situation is with regard
to southeastern Turkey or Istanbul. The number of interviewees we acquired
is, we believe, sufficient to satisfy our objectives. As we repeatedly indicated
earlier, our only concern for this research was what motivated these
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individuals to join ISIS and what kind of profile we could elaborate to further
understand the mindset of ISIS and its soldiers.
Results
Why is ISIS attractive?
Some media resources have reported several motivations behind Turkish
FTFs joining ISIS such as religious motives, especially an Islamic eschatology
claiming that Caliphate will be reborn in Damascus, money and guns,54 and
adventure. There have also been cases where occasional ‘jihadists’ were men-
tally ill and high-school drop-outs. It is clear to us after our interviews,
however, that ISIS has become more attractive than counterpart terrorist
organizations such as Al-Qaeda due to its character of appearing a ‘construc-
tive’ force.55 What makes it unique is its aspiration to immediately form a cali-
phate or pan-Islamic state as opposed to al-Qaeda’s method of accumulating
enough force and consciousness before declaring the Caliphate56 or dreams of
Hizbullah in Turkey to carry out an Islamic Revolution in Turkey one day.57
In this way, ‘having proclaimed the establishment of a Caliphate58 in mid-
2014, ISIS presented itself to the international jihadi community as having
achieved something al-Qaida had failed to do for twenty years.’59 In other
words, ISIS, unlike Al-Qaeda and others, offers a spatially organized and pol-
itically recognized life. ISIS is ‘pseudo-state led by a conventional army.’60 For
instance, children have parks to play in61 and families of ISIS have houses to
come back to after the jihad of the day or night shift. This means that the
Islamic State offers actual terrain wherein one can lead a life of discipline as
dictated by God, and then have a promised afterlife as a consequence of
their holy struggle.62 It is in this sense ‘a perfect state’ based on Sharia
law.’63 In contrast, the remnants of al-Qaida are restricted to the Afghan-Paki-
stan border where living conditions for the members become unsustainable
for a vibrant life and a productive territory. In contrast, ISIS, along with its
allies such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabaab in Somalia, as well as
independent clusters of ISIS militants in Libya and Egypt, together occupy
more physical space for a ‘caliphate’ than at any time within living
memory. This geopolitical reason alone attracts thousands from all around
the world, including Turkey for a hope that a true Islamic State is possible
in Iraq and the Levant, and perhaps beyond.
Jihad as a joker card
What immediately came across in some of our interviews with returnees was
that ‘Anatolian extremism’ is a micro and personal level of radicalization.
Motivations behind radicalization and joining radical Islamic organizations
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such as ISIS were tied to individualized reasons.64 Our focus on the individual
level, however, is not to claim that something is wrong with the Turkish FTFs
in the psychiatric sense, as argued in other contexts by Sageman and
Crenshaw.65
As for the debate on whether ISIS returnees are radicalized through group
activities or the process of radicalization took place among individuals experi-
encing benefits of likeminded social media programs in their isolated local
communities,66 our findings support both. We found that individuals, who
had joined ISIS and had a tendency to extremism, had also isolated themselves
from the mainstream Islamic interpretations and commonly practiced every-
day religious life as mentioned earlier, and instead followed very orthodox
readings of Islamic teachings and thoughts. These individuals especially
enjoyed participating in group activities such as performing jumu’ah
(Friday prayer) in cell-like mosques67 with their imam leading the prayer,
while at the same time indoctrinating themselves through videos and films
that have bombarded social media in Turkish, English and Arabic.
However, we did not see the ‘normalization of jihad’ – the ideal of fighting
to the end as a normal way of life – that Nilsson identified with the Swedish
foreign fighters in Syria.68 However, this does not mean that when ISIS sym-
pathizers’ root of radicalization, their networks, logistics and socio-cultural
backgrounds are considered, there are no common traits that unify these indi-
viduals. As opposed to McCauley and Moskalenko’s claim that ‘typically an
individual’s progress into a terrorist group is slow and gradual, with many
smaller tests before being trusted in more important missions,’69 our
sample’s transformation and participation in ISIS was fast.
One of the characteristics of the ISIS sympathizers/returnees that support
our argument is that jihad for these individuals is understood as the ultimate
path to escape from their bad deeds, understood as in the metaphor of ‘joker
card’ for cleaning of their sins and burdensome past. When we delved into
these individuals’ past lives, we clearly saw that they rarely practiced Islam
in their pre-radicalization lives. On the contrary, they lived un-Islamic lives,
mostly traumatic ones, on every level, which one can often see in marginalized
neighborhoods in Turkey. This is substantiated by media reporting on other
cases of Turkish foreign fighters as well.70 This ominous situation, later in
their life, becomes the main source of resentment and creates a situation in
which one sees no sign of ultimate redemption or change down the road to
perdition. For that reason, a radical change and desire to make an immediate
compensation dominates the mental string and sensational state of these indi-
viduals. Thus, the need for closing the gap between the negative past and their
gloomy arrival compelled these individuals to such a radical change and
motivation. A fast-track road to a better destination made it easy for them
to join such a jihadist organization like ISIS. In return, ISIS offered these
TURKISH STUDIES 625
individuals a short-cut road to heaven and a spiritual redemption that other-
wise looked impossible to redeem.
When we looked closely, we could easily observe that ISIS sympathizers
had a tendency toward straightforward reading of geopolitical developments.
They also showed eagerness to embrace interpretations of holy texts and jiha-
dist stories of a glorified past that would reinforce their reasoning for radica-
lization and extremism in the end.71 Our survey of their justification for
joining ISIS also supports the idea that these individuals’ interpretations of
Quranic texts and hadith are rigid and straightforward, leaving no room for
alternative interpretations of Islamic teachings and practices. Their under-
standing of Islam is isolated from the historical context and severely idealized.
This is in line with Sageman’s observation a decade ago that the assumption
that jihadis are well educated in religion is false. They often interpret the scrip-
tures very unconventionally and they are largely self-instructed despite some
self-appointed religious authorities are around.72 As British MI5’s Behavioral
Science Unit reported in 2008, ‘far from being religious zealots, a large
number of those involved in terrorism do not practice their faith regularly.
Many lack religious literacy and could… be regarded as religious novices.’73
Continuing on strict readings of Islamic texts, we also observed that these
individuals are dissatisfied with everyday religious practices and traditionally
accepted Islamic views. Their practice of Islam is also isolated. For them,
mosques are considered to be the place of opium and state-organized religion,
and imams appointed by the state are the servants of that softened religion.74
Understandably, ISIS sympathizers often radically distance themselves from
commonly agreed interpretations of historical events, mainstream Islamic
practices and traditional Islamic schools and thoughts, mentioned earlier in
the paper. Their attitude toward the Turkish Diyanet is a hostile one, accusing
of the organization as being impious and statist, pacifying Muslims against the
necessity for an urgent and global jihad. The same goes for Sufi Islam derived
from Konya, the so called Bible belt of Islamic Turkey.
Idiosyncratic Islam and Jihad
Generally speaking, one can talk about two segments of Islamic groups in
Turkey. One is connected to the state through the Diyanet and state religious
schools, and the other one includes those who stayed outside of the realm of
state-interpreted religion and are mostly considered to be dissident. In the
past, radicalization and participation in jihad had come mostly from the
second group that had not aligned itself with formal, ‘approved’ interpret-
ations of Islam. However, in the case of ISIS, profiles of the returnees’ show
that they do not fit neatly in either of these two categories of Islamic tradition.
This means that separate, distinct, unique, and self-proclaimed personalities
are forming a new type of jihadism to appeal to the recruiters that work for
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ISIS. This tells us that this is a new kind of unorthodox jihad – as understood
and practiced – that does not display old-fashion jihadi understandings,
which had been seen during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as well
during as the Bosnian and Chechen wars. During these wars, a great
number of jihadists joined the effort to defend so called ‘Muslim homelands’
for a cause that could be justified in the name of holy struggle against an
undisputed foreign occupier. These jihadists, back then, had never been con-
sidered a threat to Muslims or they were never marginalized in their commu-
nities back home. For instance, when jihadists’ dead bodies returned from
Afghanistan and/or Bosnia to their home back in Turkey in the 1980s and
1990s respectively, their obituaries were published in local newspapers
calling for local residents to join the funeral. Many members of the commu-
nity joined celebrating their return, and rushed to give their last respect to
deceased jihadists because in the minds of Turkish people they were not
dead but instead martyrs who had submitted to a divine duty, a deed that
only few were courageous to attempt to do.75
In our research, however, we found very little meaningful support from
Turkish people for the ISIS jihadists of Anatolia. In other words, ISIS retur-
nees, dead or alive, never had such divine luxury, nor enjoyed societal accep-
tance of their decisions. Quite the contrary of what has been claimed in many
circles that ‘old-school’ jihadists have played great role recruiting new fighters
for ISIS76 or ‘they act as “connectors” to pass best practices to wannabe jiha-
dists,’77 we could not find support for this argument in our case study. For
instance, Kaplancilar,78 one of the radical Islamist groups in Turkey, does
not support or send any soldier to ISIS ranks. In one of our interviews, we
noticed, for example, that one of the fathers of the returnees never used the
word ‘martyr’ for his dead son.79 Instead, he repeatedly used the words
‘casualty’ or ‘dead’ implying that his son does not resemble those who died
during the Afghan or Bosnian war and has been simply a waste.80 The
son’s death does not reach the level of holiness or carry a ‘badge of honor’
in the eyes of his own father. In another case a Turkish father calls the
death of his son among ISIS ranks, a ‘suicide.’81 We also noticed that one
recent returnee’s funeral was not well embraced by his relatives, friends or
neighbors, nor covered by local news media. This tells us that the ISIS
phenomenon is a new kind development and a very much-unwelcomed
movement for the mainstream Anatolian Islamic tradition. It also indicates
that there is somehow quite a gap between what is considered to be the
true jihad among families and aspiring foreign terrorist fighters in Turkey.
Temperamental individuals
When we look at the returnees’ socio-cultural characteristics, we can under-
line that these individuals show similar themes of uneasy pasts and traumatic
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social lives that inform their tendencies toward radicalization and extremism.
One common finding that we uncovered during our fieldwork is that these
individuals have a criminal past (short jail time in many cases), drug pro-
blems, and traumatic family relations.82 There may be others who we did
not speak to but may have joined ISIS to escape conviction in an unrelated
crime.83 Their denial of social order begins in their home against their
father, mother, sisters, and brothers. The first thing they do is to deny auth-
enticity of Islam that is practiced in their home. Then, they convince them-
selves that authentic Islam is only possible if the everyday state of business
has been changed from secularist system to the system of sharia as advertised
by ISIS. However, Marone, on the other hand, reaches a different conclusion
than ours after investigating three Italian converts and states that:
their radicalization pathways did not take place in traditional settings, such as
radical mosques or prisons..neither did they have criminal records nor had they
ever been to prison, with the exception of el Abboubi’s short detention in June
2013. By contrast, the Internet played an important role in their radicalization
process, especially for el Abboubi.84
Although we believe that Marone’s findings about radicals’ profile might
have been explanatory for the Italian converts they may be not so illuminative
for the Anatolian jihadists who join ISIS as far as our findings dictates us.
Another point that we noticed during our conversations with returnees was
that they seemed to be nationalist-oriented, with sharp and rigid interpret-
ations of national events, regional developments, and political situations.
During one of the interviews, one individual indicated that when he served
in the Turkish army, he went there to become a martyr (die for the state by
fighting to the end against a Kurdish terrorist group) but later he found
himself condemning Turkey for being the ‘Dar al-Harb’ where Muslims are
the minority and are systematically prosecuted. This idea attracted some sym-
pathizers to join ISIS along with their wives and kids. This surely indicates
that their motivation is not only about fighting and dying in the name of reli-
gion; but is also about hijra, a search for the perfect place (Dar-al Islam) to live
and practice their faith freely. Thus, for an Anatolian jihadist to join ISIS, the
inspiration must be more than just an opportunity to die in a holy fight but
also an opportunity to live. The motto then becomes, if there is no an
Islamic state where one can enjoy living, it is his/her obligation to establish
one and to establish one the fight becomes unavoidable.
Discussion
As highlighted throughout this paper, the radicalization demonstrated by
Turkish FTFs reveals several important elements and invites us to consider
several issues. First, as it may be clear from discussions above, many
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Turkish volunteers for terrorist groups have little knowledge of religion. For
example, the father of a dead terrorist indicated that the main reason why his
son was lost to ISIS was because of the ‘lack of proper religious education in
Turkey.’85 Indeed, it was strikingly obvious that the misinformed way they
understand Islammakes them easy prey for recruiters who present themselves
as religious authority. The two British Muslims who bought ‘Islam for
Dummies’ before heading to Syria86 seem more to be the rule than the excep-
tion; it may be similarly valid for those who travel from Anatolia to join
radical groups if a Turkish version of ‘Islam for Dummies’ existed.87
The lack of a critical approach and insufficient understanding of Islam
indicates a clear need for a renewal of Islamic education. Here, Islamic edu-
cation should not be taken at a broader level, such as education in madrasas
and/or the religious schools. Rather, what is surprisingly clear is that the basic
understanding of Islam lacks more than what many may imagine. For
example, one of the returnees from ISIS one year later said that before
going to ‘Jihad,’ he did not have much to do with Islam, and only after
joining the ranks of ISIS, did he start to practice Islam with some Islamic edu-
cation there. Strangely enough, he has changed his life back to his pre-ISIS
lifestyle after coming back, and even went to the Greek islands for holiday
and was partying (participating in activities that are forbidden in Islam
such as drinking alcohol, etc.).88 When we asked about the very contradictory
nature of his life, his answers indicated that he lacked a critical approach and
even showed ignorance in basics of Islam. This also means that talking about
religious reform and transformation of Islam is neither meaningful nor pro-
ductive in finding a solution to the current radicalization. Contrary to what
secularization thesis claimed for many years, the only way to prevent individ-
ual level radicalization is to teach religious education at the basic level in order
to enable people to understand the essence of the religion. If, as we found out,
there is no confirmed individual joining ISIS from the religious state schools
in Turkey, the İmam Hatip Schools, then we can infer that a lack of proper
Islamic teaching plays an important role in the road to combating violent
radicalism.
As we mentioned previously, the little-to-none participation from Imam-
Hatip graduates in jihad may have something to do with the education
system in those schools. In Imam-Hatip schools, students are offered
Islamic education such as Hadith, Tafseer (interpretation of the Qur’an),
Islamic philosophy, Qur’an, Fiqh (jurisprudence), and Kalam (theology) in
addition to secular sciences such as math, physics, philosophy, and social
sciences. The maturation of young minds while learning both worlds
creates a sort of convergence and tolerance in thought and action, and pre-
sents issues from a much larger perspective. These schools help acquire ‘a
well-established religious identity [which] actually protects against violent
radicalization.’89 This makes those graduates a very difficult prey for
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recruiters to join jihad simply because they ‘believe’ that they can make sense
of religious text themselves and they do not have to believe what others say.
What this means for a country like Turkey is that it can prevent radicalization
before it is too late by having a comprehensive social structuring through a
combined educational system. Blaming any religion or religious text and
forcing a reformation within religion is almost equal to a regretful waste of
precious human and material resources.
Conclusion
It is clear that as long as the instability in Iraq and Syria lingers on, these
countries will be a safe haven for radicals, meaning that the geography of dis-
order and chaos will likely continue to be both reasons for radicalization and a
destination for jihadists. We have investigated to what extent and how
Muslims living in Anatolia, considered to be the heartland of moderate
Islam, have been affected in the process. What we found is a different type
of radicalization is at play, mostly at individual level. The cases we investigated
demonstrate that radicalization is a growing socio-cultural problem. Lack of
basic understanding of religion, wanting to take a short-cut to close the gap
between an un-Islamic past and a better, redeemed future, as well as
Turkey’s geographic proximity to Syria seem to be the leading factors in
Turkish radicalization. Although it is not possible to talk about major radica-
lization in Turkey because of the small number of people joining ISIS and the
non-existence of public support for this kind of radicalization, there still needs
to be utilization of community-based social programs to disseminate Anato-
lian Islam because it has always managed to dispose of radical extremisms
from this geography. We need to note here that those who join ISIS do not
only come from poor neighborhoods as reported in the media90 but they
also come from the upper-middle class. This means that the youth is searching
for a meaning in their life, and one can see that the popularity of ISIS among
Muslim youth is rather dangerous response to their search.
In terms of de-radicalization and rehabilitation programs, we draw atten-
tion to the potential presented by disillusioned returnees, which is already
occurring Turkey as well as other places.91 This provides a good opportunity
to target those fighters who may have been in a conflict zone for the first
time and thus may have come back without actually forming a strong
‘jihadi belief.’ De-radicalization program may then have not only a valuable
opportunity to prevent the ‘deed’ but also modify returnees’ beliefs. That is,
it may be possible to reach those who were not ideologically motivated but
joined in IS for other reasons such as financial ones.92 It is these returnees
disillusioned with ISIS that Turkish rehabilitation programs must target
with measures such as vocational training especially those that come from
poorer neighborhoods.
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It is these disenchanted/disillusioned young, first-timer foreign fighters
that may be very instrumental to discredit ISIS myth and narrative about sup-
posed ‘jihad’ in Syria.93 These returnees as well as the former or retired foreign
fighters (who fought in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya), who ‘had been
there and done that,’ may carry far more authority than the Diyanet to
form a counter-narrative and reverse fighters’ radicalization process and
better convince them to enter a new process of reintegration.
[A] returning fighter will have a great deal of credibility in radical circles at
home, and if he argues against participation in the war, and against the al-
Qaeda [or ISIS for that matter] narrative more generally, this is likely to be
more effective than anything a government can do. (brackets are added)94
Utilizing ‘retired’ foreign fighters through innovative programs and forums
such as the ‘Afghan Alumni Forum’ put in place in Indonesia to de-radicalize
young Indonesian jihadists may help immensely.95
In the end, this study is a first-cut into the world of Turkish foreign terror-
ist fighters. We acknowledge limitations, including that we were not able to
ascertain in great detail the socio-economic characteristics of the Turkish
FTFs. However, we welcome future research that will delve more deeply
into the questions raised in this study.
Notes
1. Thousands of Arab foreign fighters fought in Afghanistan. See Williams, “On
the Trail”; Holman, “Belgian and French Foreign Fighters”; Malet, “Why
Foreign Fighters?”; and Baxter and Davidson, “Foreign Terrorist Fighters.”
2. Maher, “From Portsmouth to Kobane”; Higgins, “A Norway Town”; Piet,
“French Jihadists”; Kern, “Dutch Jihadists”; Graham, “What’s the Matter
with Belgium?”; and Heyer, “The Lost Children.”
3. de Bie, de Poot, and van der Leun, “Shifting Modus Operandi,” 418; Wegge-
mans, Bakker, and Grol, “Who Are They,” 101; and Silke, ed., Research on Ter-
rorism, 161–86.
4. Doostdar, “How Not to Understand ISIS.”
5. Marone, “Italian Jihadists in Syria and Iraq”; Roy and Truong, “The Attractions
of Jihadism”; Malet, “Why Foreign Fighters?” 109–10; “ICSR Insight: Professor
Neumann’s Remarks”; Maher, “The Roots of Radicalisation?”; and Barrett,
“Foreign Fighters in Syria” (Soufan Group).
6. See comments by Barret, “Foreign Fighters in Syria” (Carnegie Council);
Borum and Fein, “The Psychology of Foreign Fighters,” 9.
7. See the report by Kyle Orton about how the Bosnian jihad shaped al-Qaeda and
how Bosnia came to make ‘an epicentre in shaping the jihadi-Salafist move-
ment on the road to 9/11.’ Orton, “From Bosnia to Guantanamo.”
8. This is not to say that other Muslim-majority states escaped attention on the
issue of foreign fighters. For instance, see Delman, “ISIS in the World’s
Largest Muslim Country.”
TURKISH STUDIES 631
9. Another such case may be Indonesia, where the question of why only a very
small minority of Indonesians are attracted to ISIS has been answered in the
following terms:
Indonesia is a country that doesn’t have a repressive government, is not
under occupation, it’s politically stable, so there’s no social unrest or con-
flict, and the Muslims aren’t a persecuted minority. So when you put all of
those factors together, it’s not all that surprising that it’s actually only a
tiny minority of even the activist population that’s leaving for Syria.
Delman, “ISIS in the World’s Largest Muslim Country”
10. Hewitt and Kelley-Moore, “Foreign Fighters in Iraq,” 213; Sageman, Leaderless
Jihad, 20–1; and Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 102.
11. Luck, “Returning Jihadis.”
12. Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, 48–9; Bin Hasan, “Key Considerations,” 359–60.
13. Stenersen, “Al Qaeda’s Foot Soldiers,” 179.
14. Gambetta and Hertog, Engineers of Jihad; Hoffman, “Today’s Highly Educated
Terrorists”; Stenersen, “Al Qaeda’s Foot Soldiers,” 183; and Sageman, Leader-
less Jihad, 59.
15. Ibrahim, “Anatomy of Egypt’s Militant Islamic Groups,” 435–40.
16. Ibid.
17. de Bie, de Poot, and van der Leun, “Shifting Modus Operandi,” 426.
18. Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, 70; Charles Lister, “Returning Foreign Fighters,” 8.
19. Malet, “Foreign Fighter Mobilization,” 462.
20. Williams, “On the Trail,” 217; Neumann and Hofmeister, From the Desert, 30–
1.
21. Neumann and Hofmeister, From the Desert, 31–2. According to Malet, feeling
of existential threat is a must for any group to decide to send sons as well as
guns to a conflict zone. See Malet, “Foreign Fighter Mobilization,” 460.
22. Borum and Fein, “The Psychology of Foreign Fighters,” 5; on ‘seeking revenge’
as a motivation, see Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 109–10.
23. Stenersen, “Al Qaeda’s Foot Soldiers,” 180; Watts, “Foreign Fighters”; McCau-
ley and Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization,” 421; and de Bie,
de Poot, and van der Leun, “Shifting Modus Operandi,” 428, 434.
24. Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, 66–7; Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 251–2.
25. Indeed, in the case of Hizbullah in Turkey, there were some who joined the
group as an entire family, which shows that one member may bring in his
family with him to the organization. It is important to note that in one case
this happened after the family migrated from their village to city. See Kurt,
Din, Şiddet ve Aidiyet, 97. On the contrary, there were also those who had ten-
sions with their family after joining Hizbullah (p. 110).
26. On the dangers of criminalization with reference to the recent British example
and comments by a counselor associated with HAYAT program in Germany,
see Lister, “Returning Foreign Fighters,” 5–6 and 9–10 respectively. For the
risks of involved in rehabilitation and de-radicalization work if uncoordinated
with intelligence and law enforcement, see comments by Levitt in de Kerchove,
“Rehabilitation and Reintegration.”
27. Malet, “Foreign Fighter Mobilization,” 455.
28. Malet, “Foreign Fighter Mobilization,” 465.
29. The United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa cited in Malet,
“Foreign Fighter Mobilization,” 466.
632 N. ANAZ ET AL.
30. Porges and Stern, “Getting Deradicalization Right”; Hooper, “Denmark Intro-
duces Rehab.”
31. Malet, “Foreign Fighter Mobilization,” 466.
32. Yavuz, “Is There a Turkish Islam?” 219.
33. Reed, “Religious Life,” 237; Fuller, The New Turkish Republic; and Mardin,
“Turkish-Islamic Exceptionalism,” 148.
34. For this latter, more militant and top-down approach see Ibrahim, “Anatomy of
Egypt’s Militant Islamic Groups,” 430, 444.
35. Nuraniyah, “How ISIS Charmed.”
36. Hewitt and Kelley-Moore, “Foreign Fighters in Iraq,” 213.
37. Heper, “Does Secularism Face a Serious Threat?” 414.
38. Çarkoğlu and Toprak, Değişen Türkiye’de, 16.
39. Esmer, “World Values Survey.”
40. “Türkiye’de Dini Hayat Araştırması.”
41. Uğur, “Intellectual Roots.”
42. Daloğlu, “Turks Rumored to be Joining the Islamic State.”
43. “Head of Religious Authority Denounces ISIS”; “Erdogan: Isis Aims to Destroy.”
44. Aktay and Topçuoğlu, “Civil Society,” 282.
45. “Seçilmiş Göstergelerle Konya 2013,” 36–7.
46. Here it should be reminded that the Turkish media (traditional but especially
new media) has been awash with late Erbakan’s ‘prophetic’ comments from
some time ago about a possible future dismemberment of Syria as a prelude
to a following assault on Turkey, see “Erbakan Hoca Suriye Konusunda Uyar-
mıştı”; The current leader of the Saadet Party has been persistent in his criticism
against ISIS, portraying it as an insidious Western tool to destroy Syria and
Libya and divide Iraq to the benefit of Israel. “Kamalak: ‘Işid’i Doğuran Sebe-
pler Nelerdir?’” This information should also be juxtaposed with the obser-
vation that there is little possibility that Saadet supporters would deviate
from their party line on ISIS when their party leaders describe the war as a
Zionist plot to destroy the Muslim world.
47. “Türkiye’nin Nabzı Eylül 2014.”
48. Demirtaş, “More than 1,000 Turks.”
49. For Turkish foreign fighters’ presence in Afghanistan see Williams, “On the
Trail,” 234.
50. Williams, “Turks Join the Jihad.”
51. Hewitt and Kelley-Moore, “Foreign Fighters in Iraq,” 212; Borum and Fein,
“The Psychology,” 11.
52. Hassan, “Three Sisters, Nine Children.”
53. This difficulty has been noted in Malet, “Foreign Fighter Mobilization,” 461;
Ibrahim, “Anatomy of Egypt’s Militant Islamic Groups,” 427.
54. ‘Abu Omar says he didn’t give a damn about the apocalypse, or learning the
ways of “true” Islam, or joining a world-historical movement. It was 2013
and he just wanted guns and money’; see Weiss, “‘I Was an ISIS Jihadist.’”
55. Özkan. “Batılı Bir Terör Örgütü Olarak IŞID”; Özkan, “Tezkere Sonrası”; “Tür-
kiye’den IŞİDe Hicret Yolu”; and ‘Neden IŞİD’e Gidiyorlar.’
56. Cronin, “ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group,” 93. McCants, “How ISIL Out-terror-
ized Bin Laden.”
57. Kurt, Din, Şiddet ve Aidiyet, 150.
58. An interesting critical juncture to observe its impact on Turkish foreign fighter
trends could be ISIS’s declaration of Caliphate. It could be interesting to follow
TURKISH STUDIES 633
if this radical move made an impact on Turkish participants but we did not
follow up on this.
59. Lister, “Jihadi Rivalry,” 2.
60. Cronin, “ISIS Is Not a Terrorist,” 88.
61. Yeğinsu, “ISIS Draws a Steady Stream.”
62. Anaz, “IŞİD ve İdeal Mekan İllüzyonu.”
63. Marone, “Italian Jihadists,” 26.
64. “Radicalization Processes.”
65. Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, 16–7; Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 107.
66. Picarelli, “The Future of Terrorism.”
67. Such mosques are mainly located in slum-like neighborhoods or male domi-
nated industrial zones (Sanayi). Our two interviewers for instance were bike-
fixers and one of them was living with alcohol consuming father with no
mother. In those mosques one would find nothing but extraordinary solidarity
and comradeship as the bike-fixer explained. Imams or the other members of
the cell-like mosques would take care of problems of the attendants if help is
needed. One participant of such mosque explained that his need for a job is
taken care of by a shopper who sells cell phones. He further stated that in
the shop, he never experienced mastership as he felt like there was no boss
in the store. He said that there were complete comradeship and solidarity.
This took time before the individual joined the ISIS ranks. He indicated that
he no longer was part of the community and the shop which disappeared some-
time when he was in Syria. This practice – forming cell-like mosques- differs
from that of Hizbullah in Turkey, which preferred using the Diyanet’s
mosques and threatened those imams who refused to cooperate. See Kurt,
Din, Şiddet ve Aidiyet, 52.
68. Nilsson, “Foreign Fighters,” 351.
69. McCauley and Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization,” 419.
70. Türkiye’den “IŞİDe Hicret Yolu”; Gönültaş, “Ankara’s IS Militants Return
Home.” This finding is consistent with those of other research done in different
places. ‘Why do Lebanon’s Young Men Join ISIL?’
71. In the literature, radicalization is not necessarily a violent action or unique to a
non-state actor, an individual or a collective entity. A state can also have radical
tendencies and violent actions toward its citizens and subjects. Furthermore,
radicalization is not a certain departing point to violent extremism or/and ter-
rorism. In other words, there is no linearity between radicalism and terrorism
or one is perquisite of the other. For further clarity of the terms, see Schmid,
“Radicalization, De-Radicalization, Counter-Radicalization.”
72. Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, 51.
73. Travis quoted in Lister, “Returning Foreign Fighters,” 8.
74. Our interviews with relatives of some ISIS jihadists; also see “Türkiye’den IŞİDe
Hicret Yolu.”
75. See two memoirs published by former Turkish jihadis who fought in Afghani-
stan, Bosnia and other jihad theatres. Yıldız, Güllerin Vedası, 8, 43, 54; Tokgöz,
Cihadın Mahrem Hikayesi, 59–61.
76. Heinke and Raudszus, “German Foreign Fighters”; Hegghammer, “The Rise of
Muslim Foreign Fighters,” 72.
77. Malet, “Foreign Fighter Mobilization,” 110; Also see Kyle Orton’s argument
that ‘Bosnia became a hospitable operating environment for Islamist recruit-
ment and training and both veterans of the war and people radicalized in
634 N. ANAZ ET AL.
Bosnia since have continued to show up in the ranks of international terrorism.’
Orton, “Another Legacy.”
78. For an extensive study on Kaplancılar, see Atacan, Kutsal Göç.
79. Family of another dead-ISIS member continuously called their son and daugh-
ter-in-law who decided to join the ISIS together with her husband and small
child one day early in the morning as ‘lost’ (kayıp). The family indicated that
neither their son nor daughter in law prayed at home or participated fasting
during Ramadan which are generally considered to be very basics of Islamic
life and openly observable from outside. Although the family stated that
Islam at least the very basics of it was always practiced in their home every
day by the rest of the members, the family never pushed their son to join
praying with them. Their son’s secular life style rarely bothered the family
but they never understood their son’s recent change and behaviors which
were alien to the family, because all of a sudden, their son and daughter in
law began talking about Quran and true meaning of Islam and Islamic life.
Sometimes, the father said, the whole family got into a fight about what true
Islam meant till the mother intervened in the argument. During our interview,
the father routinely asked these questions: ‘what kind of Islam he didn’t like
here [in our home]?’ ‘What was missing here so that they have gone for the
search of better Islam?’ ‘Who is ISIS?’ ‘They are bunch of terrorists who
enjoy killing other believers.’ And he continued and asked us if we could
help him to bring his grandson back home. He strongly stated that he never
missed his son or his daughter in law.
80. “Biz Koktukça IŞİD Kazanacak.”
81. “Bingöl’ün Derdi IŞİD’e Götürdü.”
82. See also profiles reported in the media, “Türk’ün Cihatla İmtihanı.”Once again,
this profile bears some resemblance to those who joined Hizbullah in Turkey.
According to Kurt, ‘Hizbullah was very successful in creating a group belonging
and a sacred ideal to defend among young people, some of whom happened to
be drug addicts, less-educated and disadvantaged from socio-economic point of
view.’ See Kurt, Din, Şiddet ve Aidiyet, 56.
83. Yılmaz, “IŞİD’e gitti.”
84. Marone, “Italian Jihadists,” 26.
85. “Biz Koktukça IŞİD Kazanacak.”
86. Hasan, “What the jihadists.”
87. There is a general impression based on some European foreign fighters that as
opposed to ‘deeply unsexy’ al-Qaeda, for which, ‘there is no place for alcohol or
women,’ and which ‘attracted followers with religious arguments and a pseudo-
scholarly message of altruism for the sake of the ummah’, ISIS was not as selective
when it came towhowanted to join its caravan. SeeCronin, “ISIS IsNot aTerrorist
Group,” 93–4. This contention has recently been supported by leaked ISIS docu-
ments, which shows that ‘70 per cent of recruits were listed as having just “basic”
knowledgeof Shariah– the lowest possible choice.’ “ISISRecruitsHavePoorGrasp
of Faith.”Though our samplemay not allow for wide generalizations on this score,
we can say that our findings confirm this contention – one does not necessarily
know the basics in religion before qualifying to join ISIS.
88. This is reminder of what reportedly happened to some Turkish Hizbullah
members after their leader, Hüseyin Velioğlu, who they thought was invincible,
was killed by the police in 2000. Once their leader was killed, some members, in
utter shock and disbelief, who indulged in non-Islamic practices before joining
TURKISH STUDIES 635
the organization, went back to their old ways such as restarting doing drugs,
returning from religion altogether, leaving prayers and becoming leftists.
Kurt, 118.
89. Ibid.
90. “Türkün cihatla imtihanı”.
91. Gönültaş, “Ankara’s IS Militants Return Home”; Hooper, “Denmark Intro-
duces Rehab”; Luck, “Returning jihadis”; and Reed, de Roy van Zuijdewijn
and Bakker, “Pathways of Foreign Fighters,” 4. The fact that several fighters
return from the battleground disillusioned is not surprising. Also see Malet,
“Foreign Fighter Mobilization,” 459.
92. See comments by Stone in de Kerchove, “Rehabilitation and Reintegration.”
93. Hussain, “Islamic State Defectors.”
94. Barrett quoted in Reed, de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Bakker, “Pathways of
Foreign Fighters,” 4.
95. Bachelard, “Turning Away,” and Gutierrez, “How an ex-Jihadist Thinks.”
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank to the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful
and constructive comments that greatly contributed to improving the final version
of this paper. They would also like to thank to several civil societies through which
the authors had an access to ISIS returnees. Authors also acknowledge that their con-
tribution to this study was equal. All remaining errors are their own.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Note on contributors
Necati Anaz is assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Inter-
national Relations of Istanbul University. He completed his Ph.D. in 2012 at the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma with the thesis ‘Mapping Geopolitical Imaginations: Turkish
Audiences and the Valley of the Wolves-Palestine.’ Anaz previously worked at
Turkish National Police Academy in Ankara (2014–16) and Necmettin Erbakan Uni-
versity in Konya (2012–2014). His current research interests include geopolitics of
security, soft power, popular geopolitics, and geography of film audiences. He con-
tinues to publish his works in international and national academic journals. Anaz
also shares his opinions in popular media and newspapers about current geopolitical
crises and developments.
Ömer Aslan received his B.A. degree in political science from Bilkent University. After
finishing his M.Sc. in International Relations at the London School of Economics and
Political Science, he entered the Ph.D. program in political science at Bilkent Univer-
sity in 2010. He is now a Ph.D. candidate at the same university, working on his dis-
sertation in the field of civil-military relations. He is also a researcher at the Institute
for Security Sciences at the Turkish National Police Academy (TNPA). Among his
publications are ‘A Turkish Muslim Between Islamism and Turkish Nationalism:
Seyyid Ahmet Arvasi [1932–88],’ published in Turkish Studies, and ‘“Unarmed”
We Intervene, Unnoticed We Remain: The Deviant Case of “February 28th Coup”
636 N. ANAZ ET AL.
in Turkey’ published online in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. His current
research interests include the military and politics in the Muslim world, external
actors and military coup d’états, and radicalism.
Mehmet Özkan graduated from Istanbul University, Faculty of Political Science,
International Relations in 2002. He studied at University of Johannesburg, South
Africa on African issues and holds a master in European Politics from Linkopings
University, Sweden (2008) and a Ph.D. from Sevilla University, Spain (2013) with a
thesis on the role of religion/culture in shaping foreign policy mentality in Turkey,
India, and South Africa. He was a Visiting Student at Universidad Pontificia Bolivari-
ana Medellin in Colombia in 2009; a Visiting Fellow at Institute for Defense and
Security Analysis (IDSA), New Delhi, India in 2010; and Visiting Researcher at
Cairo University in Egypt in 2011. He was also a lecturer at International University
of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 2012. Between 2012 and 2014, Dr Ozkan
worked as a Researcher at the premier Turkish think-tank, SETA (Foundation for Pol-
itical, Economic, and Social Research) in Ankara. He was Director of the International
Center for Terrorism and Transnational Crime (UTSAM) at the Turkish Police
Academy between 2014 and 2015. Currently, he is Director of Turkish Cooperation
and Coordination Agency (TIKA) in Colombia and Latin America. He is also the
author several books including, Foreign Policy After Tahrir Revolution: (Re-)Defining
the Role of Egypt in the Middle East (2011) and Turkey’s Involvement in Somalia:
State-Building in Progress (2014).
Bibliography
Aktay, Yasin, and Abdullah Topçuoğlu. “Civil Society and its Cultural Origins in a
Turkish City: Konya.” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 16, no. 3 (2007):
273–287.
Anaz, Necati. “IŞİD ve İdeal Mekan İllüzyonu.” 2014. Star Açık Görüş, December 27.
Accessed September 20, 2015. http://haber.star.com.tr/acikgorus/isid-ve-ideal-
mekan-illuzyonu/haber-985334.
Atacan, Fulya. Kutsal Göç, Radikal İslamcı Bir Grubun Anatomisi. İstanbul: Bağlam
Yayınları, 1993.
Bachelard, Michael. 2012. “Turning Away from Radical Doctrines.” The Sidney
Morning Herald, October 7. Accessed July 1, 2016. http://www.smh.com.au/
world/turning-away-from-radical-doctrines-20121006-275wj.html.
Barrett, Richard. 2014. “Foreign Fighters in Syria.” Carnegie Council, September 23.
Accessed April 29, 2016. https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/
20140923/index.html.
Barrett, Richard. 2014. “Foreign Fighters in Syria.” Report for the Soufan Group.
Accessed September 12, 2015, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/
06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf.
Baxter, Kylie, and Renee Davidson. “Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Managing a Twenty-
first Century Threat.” Third World Quarterly 37, no. 8 (2016): 1299–1313.
de Bie, Jasper L., Christianne J. de Poot, and Joanne P. van der Leun. “Shifting Modus
Operandi of Jihadist Foreign Fighters from the Netherlands Between 2000 and
2013: A Crime Script Analysis.” Terrorism and Political Violence 27, no. 3
(2015): 416–440.
“Bingöl’ün Derdi IŞİD’e Götürdü”. 2015. Al Jazeera TURK. Accessed 17 September,
2015. http://appsaljazeera.com/interactive/isid_dosya/bingol.html.
TURKISH STUDIES 637
Bin Hasan, Muhammad Haniff. “Key Considerations in Counterideological Work
Against Terrorist Ideology.” In Terrorism Studies: A Reader, edited by John
Horgan and Kurt Braddock. London: Routledge, 2012.
“Biz Koktukça IŞİD Kazanacak”. 2015. Al Jazeera TURK. Accessed 17 September,
2015. http://appsaljazeera.com/interactive/isid_dosya/isid_korkusu.html.
Borum, Randy, and Robert Fein. “The Psychology of Foreign Fighters.” Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism 2016. (13 June), published online. doi:10.1080/1057610X.
2016.1188535.
Çarkoğlu, Ali, and Binnaz Toprak. Değişen Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset.
İstanbul: TESEV, 2006.
Crenshaw, Martha. “The Causes of Terrorism.” In Terrorism Studies: A Reader, edited
by John Horgan and Kurt Braddock. London: Routledge, 2012.
Cronin, Audrey K. “ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group: Why CounterterrorismWon’t Stop
the Latest Jihadist Threat.” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 2 (2015): 87–98.
Daloğlu, Tulin. 2014. “Turks Rumored to be Joining the Islamic State.” Al-Monitor,
October 1. Accessed December 28, 2014. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
originals/2014/10/turkey-syria-isis-coalition-polls.html.
Delman, Edward. 2016. “ISIS in the World’s Largest Muslim Country: Why Are so
few Indonesians Joining the Islamic State?” The Atlantic, January 3. Accessed
June 8, 2016. http://wwwhttp://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/
01/isis-indonesia-foreign-fighters/422403/fighters-201496125229948625.html.
Demirtaş, Serkan. 2014. “More than 1,000 Turks Fighting for the Islamic Caliphate.”
Hurriyet Daily News, August 2. Accessed June 26, 2015. http://www.
hurriyetdailynews.com/more-than-1000-turks-fighting-for-the-islamic-caliphate-.
aspx?PageID=238&NID=69867&NewsCatID=429.
Doostdar, Alireza. 2014. “How Not to Understand ISIS.” University of Chicago
Divinity School, October 2. Accessed November 19, 2015. https://divinity.
uchicago.edu/sightings/how-not-understand-isis-alireza-doostdar.
“Erbakan Hoca Suriye Konusunda Uyarmıştı”. 2015. Yeni Akit, July 1. Accessed
September 13, http://www.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/erbakan-hoca-suriye-
konusunda-uyarmisti-78576.html.
“Erdogan: Isis Aims to Destroy All Aspects of Islamic Civilization, Culture”. 2015.
Daily Sabah, March 4. Accessed May 17, 2015. http://www.dailysabah.com/
diplomacy/2015/03/04/erdogan-isis-aims-to-destroy-all-aspects-of-islamic-
civilization-culture.
Esmer, Yılmaz. 2012. “World Values Survey 2011.” http://www.worldvaluessurvey.
org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp.
Fuller, Graham. The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim
World. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2008.
Gambetta, Diego, and Steffen Hertog. Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection
Between Violent Extremism and Education. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2016.
Gönültaş, Hale. 2016. “Ankara’s IS Militants Return Home.” Al-Monitor, July 5.
Accessed July 6, 2016. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/
turkey-syria-isis-hacibayram-militants-return-home.html.
Graham, David A. 2015. “What’s the Matter with Belgium?” The Atlantic. November
17. Accessed December 4, 2015. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/
2015/11/belgium-radical-islam-jihad-molenbeek-isis/416235/.
Gutierrez, Natashya. 2016. “How an Ex-jihadist Thinks Indonesia Can Deradicalize
Terrorists.” Rappler, January 20. Accessed July 2, 2016. http://www.rappler.com/
638 N. ANAZ ET AL.
world/regions/asia-pacific/indonesia/bahasa/englishedition/119625-jihadist-
deradicalization-jakarta-attacks.
Hasan, Mehdi. 2014. “What the Jihadists Who Bought ‘Islam for Dummies’ on
Amazon Tell us about Radicalization.” NewStatesman, August 21. Accessed
September 26, 2014. http://www.newstatesman.com/religion/2014/08/what-
jihadists-who-bought-islam-dummies-amazon-tell-us-about-radicalisation.
Hassan, Hassan. 2015. “Three Sisters, Nine Children, One Dangerous Journey to the
Heart of Isis. What Is the Lure of the Caliphate?” The Guardian, June 21. Accessed
December 12, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/21/three-sisters-
nine-children-what-is-the-lure-of-the-isis-caliphate.
“Head of Religious Authority Denounces ISIS”. 2014. Daily Sabah, August 20.
Accessed December 16, 2014. http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2014/08/20/
head-of-religious-authority-denounces-isis.
Hegghammer, Thomas. “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters.” International Security
35, no. 3 (2010/2011): 53–94.
Heinke, Daniel H., and Jan Raudszus. 2015. “German Foreign Fighters in Syria &
Iraq.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, January 20. Accessed April
18, 2015, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/german-foreign-fighters-in-syria-and-
iraq.
Heper, Metin. “Does Secularism Face a Serious Threat in Turkey?” Comparative
Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 29, no. 3 (2009): 413–422.
Hewitt, Christopher, and Jessica Kelley-Moore. “Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A Cross-
national Analysis of Jihadism.” Terrorism and Political Violence 21, no. 2 (2009):
211–220.
Heyer, Julia Amalia. 2014. “The Lost Children: France Takes Stock of Growing
Jihadist Problem.” Spiegel International, November 6. Accessed September 23,
2015. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/france-struggles-to-deal-with-
young-jihadist-exodus-to-syria-a-1001254.html.
Higgins, Andrew. 2015. “A Norway Town and Its Pipeline to Jihad in Syria.”
New York Times, April 4.
Hoffman, Bruce. 2010. “Today’s Highly Educated Terrorists.” The National Interest,
September 15. Accessed June 6, 2016. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/bruce-
hoffman/todays-highly-educated-terrorists-4080.
Holman, Timothy. “Belgian and French Foreign Fighters in Iraq 2003–2005:
A Comparative Case Study.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 8 (2015):
603–621.
Hooper, Simon. 2014. “Denmark Introduces Rehab for Syrian Fighters.” Al Jazeera,
September 7. Accessed June 2, 2016. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/
2014/09/denmark-introduces-rehab-syrian-fighters-201496125229948625.html.
Hussain, Murtaza. 2016. “Islamic State Defectors Hold Key to Countering Group’s
Recruitment.” The Intercept, July 11. Accessed July 12, 2016. https://theintercept.
com/2016/07/11/islamic-state-defectors-hold-key-to-countering-groups-
recruitment/.
Ibrahim, Saad E. “Anatomy of Egypt’s Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note
and Preliminary Findings.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 12, no. 4
(1980): 423–453.
“ICSR Insight: Professor Neumann’s Remarks at White House Summit”. 2015. The
International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence
(ICSR), February 20. Accessed May 2016. http://icsr.info/2015/02/icsr-insight-
professor-neumanns-remarks-white-house-summit/.
TURKISH STUDIES 639
“ISIS Recruits Have Poor Grasp of Faith”. 2016. Al Arabiya. August 15. Accessed
August 22, 2016. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2016/08/15/-
ISIS-recruits-have-poor-grasp-of-faith.html.
“Kamalak: ‘Işid’i Doğuran Sebepler Nelerdir?’”. 2015. Haberler.com, January
3. Accessed September 13. http://www.haberler.com/kamalak-isid-i-doguran-
sebepler-nelerdir-6832389-haberi/.
de Kerchove, Gilles, Jacob Bundsgaard, Doug Stone, and Matthew Levitt. 2015.
“Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters.” The
Washington Institute Policy Analysis, February 23. Accessed June 3, 2016. http://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/rehabilitation-and-
reintegration-of-returning-foreign-terrorist-fighters.
Kern, Soeren. 2014. “Dutch Jihadists in Syria Pose Threat to the Netherlands.”
Gatestone Institute. May 15. Accessed September 12, 2015. http://www.
gatestoneinstitute.org/4308/dutch-jihadists-syria.
Kurt, Mehmet. 2015. Din, Şiddet ve Aidiyet: Türkiye’de Hizbullah. İstanbul: İletişim
Yayınları.
Lister, Charles. 2015. “Returning Foreign Fighters: Criminalization or Reintegration?”
Brooking Institution. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/
2015/08/13-foreign-fighters-lister/en-fighters-web.pdf.
Lister, Charles. 2016. “Jihadi Rivalry: The Islamic State Challenges Al-Qaeda.”
Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, no. 16. http://www.brookings.edu/~/
media/research/files/papers/2016/01/27-the-islamic-state-challenges-alqaida-
lister/en-jihadi-rivalry.pdf.
Luck, Taylor. 2015. “Returning Jihadis: At Luxurious Rehab Center, a Saudi Cure for
Extremism.” The Christian Science Monitor, May 17. Accessed June 8, 2016. http://
www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2015/0517/Returning-jihadis-At-
luxurious-rehab-center-a-Saudi-cure-for-extremism.
Maher, Shiraz. 2014. “From Portsmouth to Kobane: The British Jihadis Fighting for
Isis.” New Statesman, November 6. Accessed December 16, 2015. http://www.
newstatesman.com/2014/10/portsmouth-kobane.
Maher, Shiraz. 2015. “The Roots of Radicalisation? It’s Identity, Stupid.” The
Guardian, 17 June. Accessed August 25, 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2015/jun/17/roots-radicalisation-identity-bradford-jihadist-causes.
Malet, David. “Foreign Fighter Mobilization and Persistence in a Global Context.”
Terrorism and Political Violence 27, no. 3 (2015): 454–473.
Malet, David. “Why Foreign Fighters? Historical Perspectives and Solutions.” Orbis
Journal of Foreign Affairs 54, no. 1 (2010): 97–114.
Mardin, Şerif. “Turkish-Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity,
Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes.” Turkish Studies 6, no. 2
(2005): 145–165.
Marone, Francesco. “Italian Jihadists in Syria and Iraq.” Journal of Terrorism Research
7, no. 1 (2016): 20–35.
McCants, William. 2015. “How ISIL Out-Terrorized Bin Laden.” Politico, August 19.
Accessed December 22, 2015. http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/08/
isis-jihad-121525#.VdXrKab3ac2.
McCauley, Clark, and Sophia Moskalenko. “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization:
Pathways Toward Terrorism.” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 3 (2008):
415–433.
‘Neden IŞİD’e Gidiyorlar’. Al Jazeera TURK. 2015. Accessed 17 September, 2015.
http://appsaljazeera.com/interactive/isid_dosya/neden_gidiyorlar.html.
640 N. ANAZ ET AL.
Neumann, Peter R., and Wilhelm Hofmeister, eds. 2015. From the Desert to World
Cities the New Terrorism. Singapore: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Ltd.
Nilsson, Marco. “Foreign Fighters and the Radicalization of Local Jihad: Interview
Evidence from Swedish Jihadists.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 38, no. 5
(2015): 343–358.
Nuraniyah, Navhat. 2015. “How ISIS Charmed New Generation of Indonesian
Militants.” Middle East Institute, January 9. Accessed June 3, 2016. http://www.
mei.edu/content/map/how-isis-charmed-new-generation-indonesian-militants.
Orton, Kyle W. 2015. “Another Legacy of the Bosnian Jihad.” February 5. Accessed
February 11, 2016. https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2016/02/05/another-
legacy-of-the-bosnian-jihad/.
Orton, Kyle W. 2016. “From Bosnia to Guantanamo.” January 23. Accessed January
28, 2016. https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2016/01/23/from-bosnia-to-
guantanamo/.
Özkan, Mehmet. 2014. “Batılı Bir Terör Örgütü Olarak IŞID.” Star Açık Görüş,
September 13. Accessed September 17, 2015. http://haber.star.com.tr/sondakika/
batili-bir-teror-orgutu-olarak-isid/haber-939625.
Özkan, Mehmet. 2014. “Tezkere Sonrası IŞID Politikasının Şifreleri.” Star Açık Görüş,
October 4. Accessed 17 September, 2015. http://haber.star.com.tr/acikgorus/
tezkere-sonrasi--isid-politikasinin--sifreleri/haber-948071.
Picarelli, John T. “The Future of Terrorism.” NIJ Journal no. 264 (2009): 26–30.
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/228387.pdf.
Piet, Remi. 2014. “French Jihadists in Syria and Cyber-indoctrination.” Al Jazeera,
April 24. Accessed August 27, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/
2014/04/french-combatants-syria-cyber-in-20144246186475801.html.
Porges, Marisa L, and Jessica Stern. “Getting Deradicalization Right.” Foreign Affairs
89, no. 3 (2010): 55–57.
“Radicalization Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism”. 2008. The European
Commission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalization. http://www.gsdrc.org/
document-library/radicalisation-processes-leading-to-acts-of-terrorism/.
Reed, Howard. “Religious Life of Modern Turkish Muslims.” In Islam and the West,
edited by Richard N. Frye, 108–148. The Hague: Mouton, 1957.
Reed, Alastair, Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn, and Edwin Bakker. 2015. “Pathways of
Foreign Fighters: Policy Option and Their (Un)Intended Consequences.”




Roy, Olivier, and Nicholas Truong. 2014. “The Attractions of Jihadism, and a
Generational Nihilism Stretching far Beyond the Muslim Sphere.” Open
Democracy, October 8. Accessed January 21, 2016, https://www.opendemocracy.
net/can-europe-make-it/olivier-roy-nicholas-truong/attractions-of-jihadism-and-
generational-nihilism-str.
Sageman, Marc. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-first Century.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
Schmid, Alex P. 2013. “Radicalization, De-radicalization, Counter-radicalization: A




“Seçilmiş Göstergelerle Konya 2013”. 2013. Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, September
2014. http://www.tuik.gov.tr/ilGostergeleri/iller/KONYA.pdf.
Silke, Andrew, ed. Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures.
New York: Routledge, 2004.
Stenersen, Anne. “Al Qaeda’s Foot Soldiers: A Study of the Biographies of Foreign
Fighters Killed in Afghanistan and Pakistan Between 2002 and 2006.” Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 3 (2011): 171–198.
Tokgöz, Bülend. Cihadın Mahrem Hikayesi. 3rd ed. İstanbul: Ark Yayınları, 2015.
“Türkiye’den IŞİDe Hicret Yolu”. 2015. Al JazeeraTurk. Accessed September 17, 2015.
http://appsaljazeera.com/interactive/isid_dosya/konyali_dede.html.
“Türkün cihatla imtihanı 7 Hürriyet muhabiri IŞİD’in izini sürdü”. 2014. Hürriyet,
September 21. Accessed February 23, 2016. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/turkun-
cihatla-imtihani-7-hurriyet-muhabiri-isidin-izini-surdu-27241293.
“Türkiye’de Dini Hayat Araştırması”. 2015. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı. Accessed
January 18, 2015, http://www2.diyanet.gov.tr/StratejiGelistirme/Afisalanlari/
dinihayat.pdf.
“Türkiye’nin Nabzı Eylül 2014: Türkiye’nin IŞİD Algısı: İslam, Şiddet ve Hükümet
Politikası”. 2014. Metropoll Stratejik ve Sosyal Araştırmalar. Accessed December
1, 2014. http://www.metropoll.com.tr/upload/content/files/1772-turkiyenin-
nabzi-eylul-2014.pdf.
Uğur, Etga. “Intellectual Roots of ‘Turkish Islam’ and Approaches to the ‘Turkish
Model.’” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 24, no. 2 (2004): 327–345.
Watts, Clinton. 2008. “Foreign Fighters: How Are They Being Recruited? Two
Imperfect Recruitment Models.” Small Wars Journal, June 22. Accessed August
18, 2016. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/foreign-fighters-how-are-they-
being-recruited.
Weggemans, Daan, Edwin Bakker, and Peter Grol. “Who Are They andWhy Do They
Go? The Radicalization and Preparatory Processes of Dutch Jihadist Foreign
Fighters.” Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 4 (2014): 100–110.
Weiss, Michael. 2016. “‘I Was an ISIS Jihadist – Until They Arrested and Tortured
Me.’” The Daily Beast, July 22. Accessed September 14, 2016. http://www.
thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/07/22/i-was-an-isis-jihadist-until-they-arrested-
and-tortured-me.html?via=desktop&source=twitter.
“Why Do Lebanon’s Young Men Join ISIL?”. 2015. AlJazeera, January 15. Accessed
March 9, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/01/why-do-
lebanon-young-men-join-isil-20151145367392756.html.
Williams, Brian. G. 2006. “Turks Join the Jihad in Iraq and Afghanistan.” The
Jamestown Foundation, December 8. Accessed July 2, 2016. http://www.
jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=994.
Williams, Brian. G. “On the Trail of the ‘Lions of Islam’: Foreign Fighters in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, 1980-2010.” Orbis Journal of Foreign Affairs 55, no. 2
(2011): 216–239.
Yavuz, M. Hakan. “Is There a Turkish Islam? The Emergence of Convergence and
Consensus.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 24, no. 2 (2004): 213–232.
Yeğinsu, Ceylan. 2014. “ISIS Draws a Steady Stream of Recruits from Turkey.” The
New York Times, September 15.
Yıldız, Bahattin. Güllerin Vedası. 4th ed. İstanbul: Özgün Yayıncılık, 2010.
Yılmaz, Aykut. 2015. “IŞİD’e gitti, yaralanıp döndü tekrar savaşmaya gitti.”
Habertürk, July 28. Accessed February 18, 2016. http://www.haberturk.com/
gundem/haber/1108181-iside-gitti-yaralanip-dondu-tekrar-savasmaya-gitti.
642 N. ANAZ ET AL.
